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THE DOUBLE HURDLE MODEL IN THE PRESENCE OF FIXED COSTS 
 
Households commonly incur fixed costs in making the decision to trade in a market.  These costs 
can involve pecuniary expenditures, such as a fixed fee to enter a market in order to sell product.  
More commonly, the fixed costs of market participation involve time spent in search for and 
screening of counterpart transactors and in negotiating and enforcing contracts.  Such costs are 
known to exist irrespective of transactions volume and surely affect the logically subsequent 
decision over how much quantity to supply to the market.  Yet the standard estimation of market 
supply equations fails to account for these fixed costs.  In this paper we demonstrate a method 
for estimating the double hurdle model of market participation and supply volume determination 
in the face of unobservable fixed costs.   
 The next section presents a simple model of the adoption decision and uses some familiar 
specifications to motivate the basic ideas.  Section three presents the econometric model.  
Section four presents the estimation algorithm.  Section five presents modifications incurred 
when fixed-costs are non-negligible.  Section six discusses the application and section seven 
presents results.  Conclusions are offered in section eight.  
 
Market Participation As An Adoption Decision 
Over the past decade or so, economists have begun to treat market supply decisions as a 
sequence of two steps, a market participation decision followed by a supply volume decision 
(Goetz 1992, Key et al. 2000). The notion of two-step decision-making can be motivated in the 
following way.  Let i = 1, 2, .., N denote the households in question.  Each household compares 
the level of utility derived from market participation, ypi*, against its reservation utility attainable 
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without market participation, yri*.  Here, we use the superscipt “*” to denote the fact that both 
levels of utility are latent (unobservable) random variables.  We will follow this convention 
below.   
 We assume that the difference between the utility levels is determined by a vector of 
characteristics specific to each household, xpi.  Without loss of generality, we set yri* = 0 and 
denote the difference between the incurred and reserve utility levels ypi, and their relationship to 
the characteristics by the function ƒi(⋅).  The condition characterizing the discrete choice about 
whether to participate in the market can then be written 
 ypi  =   ƒi(xpi),                   (1) 
with participation when ypi > 0 and nonparticipation otherwise.  We now let the indicator 
variable  δi = 1 when ypi  > 0 and the household participates in the market, with δi = 0 under 
nonparticipation.   
 Statistical implementation depends on the information structure of this choice problem, in 
particular whether the discrete participation decision occurs before a corresponding quantity 
decision is undertaken about the intensity of participation, in this case, as to how much quantity 
to supply to the market.  As is customary, we assume the participation decision is made first and 
that, conditional on that decision, the household now faces a corresponding quantity decision.   
 In introducing the multivariate econometric model, below, it will be useful to conserve on 
notation.  Hence, in presenting the sales decision, we continue to use y to reference the 
endogenous variable of interest, but distinguish the sales quantity from the latent participation 
variable through subscripts, the former denoted ysi and the latter denoted ypi.  Let Φi( · ) denote 
the level of a maximand – e.g., profit or utility – defined over the supply quantity, ysi, and let ϕi( 
· ) denote its first-order partial derivative with respect to this quantity.  Naturally, this decision 
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will also be affected by a set of household characteristics, which may be the same or may differ 
from the ones affecting the participation action. Let xsi denote these characteristics.  Across each 
of the households i = 1, 2, ..  N,  we are concerned with the problem: 
   Φ
siy
max i( ysi | xsi )  subject to  ysi   ≥  0        (2) 
and the associated first-order conditions for a maximum; namely the derivative condition on the 
objective function, 
 ϕi( ysi | xsi)  ≤  0;                  (3) 
the non-negativity restriction on choice, 
 ysi   ≥  0;                    (4) 
and the complementary-slackness condition, 
 ϕi( ysi | xsi ) ysi  =  0.                 (5) 
Equations (1)-(5) form the basis for a double-hurdle interpretation of the household’s supply 
decision, on which we now expand. 
 
A Standard Double-Hurdle Model Of The Supply Decision  
Assume that the households, i = 1, 2, .., N generate a sample (of size N) independent supply 
decisions.  For each household in the sample the decision as to how much quantity to supply is a 
double-hurdle problem with three components.  Observed sales are  
 ysi  =  δi ysi**,                   (6) 
where δi is the market participation indicator variable and ysi** refers to a potentially censored 
target sales quantity..  A linear version of the participation equation (equation (1)) has the form 
 ypi  =  βp xpi + upi,                  (7) 
where δi = 1 if ypi > 0 and δi = 0 otherwise, where βp is a vector of unknown coefficients 
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controlling the relationship between household-specific characteristics and market participation, 
and upi is a random error.  Finally, the model is completed by inclusion of a sales equation,  
 ysi*  =  βs xsi + usi,                  (8) 
where we observe ysi** = max {0, ysi*}; ysi* is the latent (random) optimal sales volume, which is 
related to the household-specific covariates, xsi, by the vector βs, with usi a random error.   
 Equations (6)-(8), along with their restrictions, combine to yield the double-hurdle 
motivation for participation.  This notion is exhibited clearly in equation (6), which states that 
two conditions must be met in order for positive sales to be observed.  First, the indicator 
variable, δi, must be positive.  In other words, the condition ypi > 0 must prevail in equation (7).  
Second, the latent quantity ysi* must exceed zero in equation (8).  Hence, both the participation- 
and the sales-equations “constraints” must be satisfied in order for positive sales to arise.   
 Equation (7) is simply a linear, statistical interpretation of the participation decision in 
equation (1) and, when the error is normal, has the (important) connotation of a probit equation.  
Equation (8) follows from relaxing the non-negativity constraint in equation (4), ignoring the 
complementary-slackness condition in equation (5) and acknowledging that, when one does so, a 
latent, censored (Tobit) regression is implied in which observed sales are left-censored at zero.   
 
Estimation 
Because two conditions must be met in order for positive sales to arise, the likelihood of 
observing a positive observation is simply the conditional data density for that observation 
multiplied by the joint probability that the two events occur, or  
 l( ysi > 0)  =  ƒ( ysi | δi = 1 and ysi > 0) × prob(δi = 1 and ysi* > 0).     (9) 
Consequently, the likelihood for observing zero sales is the probability that neither of the two 
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conditions in question prevail, or  
 l( ysi = 0)  =  1- prob(δi = 1 and ysi* > 0).           (10) 
If the errors in the participation and sales equations (upi and usi, respectively) are independent, 
then the joint probability of the two events occurring (δi = 1 and ysi* > 0) can be factored into the 
product of marginal probabilities.  Other recent work has used that simplifying restriction (Key 
et al., 2000). Less restrictively, one can assume that the errors in (7) and (8) follow a 
multivariate normal distribution.  In this context equation (7) depicts a traditional probit 
regression, equation (8) depicts a traditional Tobit regression, and the multivariate-normal 
assumption allows correlation between the errors, as in Nelson (1977), Cogan (1981) or Goetz 
(1992).  By combining results in Chib and in Albert and Chib, some algebra (available upon 
request) reveals that the full conditional distributions for the unknown quantities have simple 
forms, wherein a Gibbs-sampling, data-augmentation algorithm can be constructed in order to 
simulate from the joint posterior distribution for the system parameters. 
 More precisely, stacking (7) and (8) as 
 y  =  x β  +  u,                  (11) 
where y ≡ (yp′, ys′)′, yp ≡ (yp1, yp2, .., ypN)′, ys ≡ (ys1, ys2, .., ysN)′; x ≡ (x1, x2)′, x1 ≡ (xp, 0s)′,   x2 ≡ 
(0p, xs)′, xp ≡ (xp1, xp2, .., xpN)′, xp1 ≡ (xp11, xp12, .., xp1kp), xp2 ≡ (xp21, xp22, .., xp2kp), .., xpN ≡ (xpN1, 
xpN2, .., xpNkp), xs ≡ (xs1, xs2, .., xsN)′, xs1 ≡ (xs11, xs12, .., xs1ks), xs2 ≡ (xs21, xs22, .., xs2ks), .., xsN ≡ 
(xsN1, xsN2, .., xsNks); β ≡ (βp′, βs′)′, βp ≡ (βp1, βp2, .., βpkp)′, βs ≡ (βs1, βs2, .., βsks)′; 0p and 0s are null 
vectors of dimensions N×ks and N×kp, respectively; and the 2N vector u ≡ (up′, us′)′, up ≡ (up1, 
up2, .., upN)′, us ≡ (us1, us2, .., usN)′, is assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution with 
mean the 2N null vector and covariance Σ⊗IN.  The parameters of the 2×2 covariance matrix Σ 
are important because they indicate the degree to which errors in the discrete- and continuous-
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choice components of the double-hurdle decision are correlated. 
 The system in (11) is in the form of Zellner’s (1971) seemingly-unrelated regressions model 
(equations (8.72)-(8.78), p. 241).  As such, the model plays an important role in another discrete-
choice setting that has received considerable attention of late, the multinomial-probit model (see, 
for examples, Geweke et al. 1994 and 1997; McCulloch et al., and Dorfman).  In those situations, 
a Gibbs-sampling, data-augmentation algorithm is used to simulate from the joint posterior.  We 
demonstrate below that this estimation strategy also proves successful in the double-hurdle 
context.  However, in the double-hurdle case, the two-step decision implies additional 
restrictions.  In this regard, note that the 2Nx1 vector y contains both observed and latent 
components.  The first N components, yp, are all latent and some proportion of the second 
component, ys, will also be unobserved.  In particular, define c ≡ { i | ysi = 0 } as the censor set 
corresponding to the households for which zero supply (market sales) is observed.  For each 
household belonging to the censor set a latent (nonpositive) quantity of sales is implied.  These 
quantities facilitate estimation (a point that is demonstrated to great effect in the seminal paper 
by Chib) but they are also interesting in a policy context, conveying the notion of a ‘distance’ at 
which these non-participating households stand from the market.  But restrictions dictated by the 
double-hurdle representation must be placed on these latent quantities during estimation.  There 
are several variants of these restrictions.  The variants arise in correspondence to the 
investigator’s interpretation of the hurdling sequence in the two-step decision-making process.  
The respective variants can be characterized with reference to the probability masses of the four, 
respective events: E1 ≡ the event (δi = 1 and ysi* > 0), E2 ≡ the event (δi = 1 and ysi* ≤ 0), E3 ≡ the 
event (δi = 0 and ysi* > 0) and E4 ≡ the event (δi = 0 and ysi* ≤ 0).  These four events are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive and  motivate four, alternative specifications of the sampling model.   
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Model One 
The first and most natural interpretation, due to its links with standard Tobit and probit 
formulations, is to consider the joint restrictions δi = 1 and ysi* > 0 as perfectly correlated.  This 
interpretation, in effect, assigns zero probability to events E2 and E3 (prob(δi = 1 and ysi* ≤ 0) = 
prob(δi = 0 and ysi* > 0) = 0).  Then, according to the restrictions implied by the probit model 
(equation (7)) all N elements of yp are latent with ypi truncated to the positive (negative) orthant 
according to δi = 1 (δi = 0) and, in addition, the censored components of ys are all constrained to 
be negative. 
Model Two 
The second model assigns zero mass to event E2 but not to E3.  Here prob(δi = 1 and ysi* ≤ 0) = 0 
but prob(δi = 0 and ysi* > 0) ≠ 0.  Accordingly, we model this situation by simulating a draw 
from the probit model (as above) but now do not constrain the draws for the latent supplies to be 
negative. 
Model Three 
The third model assigns zero mass to event E3 but not to E2.  Here prob(δi = 0 and ysi* > 0) = 0 
but prob(δi = 1 and ysi* ≤ 0) ≠ 0.  By analogy to the previous case, we simulate this situation by 
constraining the draws in the Tobit regression to be negative but do not constrain the 
corresponding draws in the probit regression.  Other variants of the basic set-up are possible, but 
the three presented appear to be the ones that have attracted most attention in the literature (see, 
for examples, Cragg, Fin and Schmidt, and Jones and the references therein).   
 A particularly attractive feature of the estimation algorithm that we are about to present is the 
ease with which these variants of the basic model can be simulated and tested as part of a model 
selection exercise.  Because the three variants imply a set of nested restrictions on the most 
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general specification, this comparison is performed robustly and intuitively by imposing the 
implied restrictions and computing at each round of the Gibbs sequence the relative number of 
violations.   
 Experiments in the present setting suggest that the first variant (model one) strongly 
dominated the other two variants (model two and model three) and, hence, reports are made only 
for the model 1 specification.  In addition, further experimentation led to the conclusion that the 
same covariates were significant in explaining both the participation and the supply decisions. 
 In this case, seemingly-unrelated regressions model (equation (12)) reverts to the traditional 
multivariate regression system (Zellner, equation (8.1), p. 224) and estimation is slightly 
simplified.  In terms of equations (11), the modifications implied are y ≡ (yp, ys); x ≡ xp ≡ xs; x 
has dimensions N×k; β ≡ (βp, βs); and u ≡ (up, us) is now assumed to have a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean the N×2 null vector and covariance Σ⊗IN.  Additionally, due to the facts 
that the vector yp is latent, and a subset of the components of ys is also latent, we use the symbols 
zp and zs to signify the corresponding observed vectors with the latent components included.  
Hence, z ≡ (zp, zs).  Finally, in a conventional notation, we note that there are m = 2 equations in 
the system.   
 With this notation at hand, under a conventional, non-informative prior π(Σ, β, zp, zs) ∝ |Σ|-
(m+1)/2, the full conditional distributions comprising the joint posterior for the unknown 
parameters and the latent data, π(Σ, β, zp, zs | y, x), have the following forms: 
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 zp | Σ, β, zs   ~ truncated-normal(Ezp, Vzp), 
 zs | zp, Σ, β   ~ truncated-normal(Ezs, Vzs), 
 β | zs, zp, Σ    ~ normal(Eβ, Vβ),            (12) 
 Σ | β, zs, zp    ~ inverted-Wishart(W, v); 
where Ezp ≡ x βp + Σps Σss-1 (zs - x βs), Vzp ≡ Σpp - Σps Σss-1Σsp; Ezs ≡ x βs + Σsp Σpp-1 (zp - x βs), 
Vzs ≡ Σss - Σsp Σpp-1Σps; Eβ ≡ (x′x)-1z, Vβ ≡ Σ ⊗ (x′x)-1; W ≡ (z – x β)′(z – x β), v ≡ N-k+m+1; 
and the 2×2 matrix Σ has (scalar) components Σpp,  Σps,  Σsp has  Σss.  Consequently, simulations 
from the joint posterior can be undertaken through the following algorithm: 
Step 1: Select starting values zp(s), zs(s), β(s).  
Step 2: Draw Σ(s) from the inverted-Wishart(W(s), v) distribution, where W(s) 
implies conditioning on  zp(s), zs(s), β(s) from Step 1. 
Step 3: Draw β(s+1) from the multivariate-normal(Eβ(s+1), Vβ(s+1)) distribution, 
where Eβ(s+1) and Vβ(s+1) denote conditioning on zp(s), zs(s) and Σ(s) from Steps 1 
and 2. 
Step 4: Draw zp(s+1) from the multivariate-normal(Ezp(s+1), Vzp(s+1)) distribution, 
where Ezp(s+1) and Vzp(s+1) denote conditioning on zs(s), Σ(s) and β(s+1) from Steps 1, 
2 and 3.                   (13) 
 Step 5: Draw zs(s+1) from the multivariate-normal(Ezs(s+1), Vzs(s+1)) distribution, 
where Ezs(s+1) and Vzs(s+1) denote conditioning on Σ(s), β(s+1) and zp(s+1), from Steps 
2, 3 and 4. 
Step 6: Repeat steps 1-5 a large number of times, S1, until convergence is 
attained. 
Step 7: Repeat steps 1-5 a large number of times, S2, and collect samples {Σ(s) s = 
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1, 2, .. S}, {β(s) s = 1, 2, .. S}, {zp(s) s = 1, 2, .. S} and {zs(s) s = 1, 2, .. S}. 
Three additional features of the algorithm are necessary for convergence.  First, due to 
identification problems, the draw from the inverted-Wishart in step 2 is normalized on the 
parameter Σpp so that the variance implied in the probit equation is one.  This is the traditional 
restriction imposed in univariate settings.  Second, only a component of the vector zs, 
corresponding to the households in the censor set, are drawn from the conditional normal 
distribution and the draws for both zp and zs in steps 4 and 5 are made in accordance with the 
restrictions implied by the various models.  Finally, the samples collected in the last step can be 
used to draw inferences about any of the unknown quantities of interest.  In the results reported 
below, the algorithm is run for a “burn-in phase” of S1 = 2,000 observations followed by a 
“collection phase” of S2 = 2,000 observations.  
 In closing this section it seems natural to ask the extent to which the well-known problem of 
sample selection bias (see, for example, Greene, pp. 926-33.) may be problematic and whether 
there is need to apply correction procedures, such as those outlined in Heckman (1976, 1979) 
and applied in Goetz.  Sample selection could arise in our context, in considering the effect upon 
sales of an increase in a level of a covariate, where some individuals who possess the covariate 
do not sell product.  Had those individuals who do not sell been excluded from the sample then a 
selection bias exists due to the fact that only those respondents selling product are used to form 
an estimate of the response to the covariate.  For example, if the covariate in question is related 
positively to sales, then only those respondents with a relatively strong response to the covariate 
will be included, leading to an upwards bias in the corresponding parameter estimate.  But, 
because a latent (negative) sales quantity is simulated for each of the non-selling households and 
used as the dependent variable in a subsequent estimation step, no such bias exists.  In short, the 
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problem of sample selection bias is conveniently circumvented through the data-augmentation 
step in the Gibbs-sampled double-hurdle model.  In addition, related identification problems 
arising in frequentist applications, like the need to include non-identical covariate matrices in the 
probit and Tobit equations (as, for example, in Goetz) are similarly circumvented.  Hence the 
algorithm (13) appears to offer a number of attractive features compared with more traditional 
methodology. 
 
The Complicating Presence of Fixed Costs 
Until now, we have said very little about the issue of fixed costs nor about their impact on the 
sales decision and an appropriate estimation strategy.  With the layout for the traditional model 
firmly in place, these issues can now be handled with relative ease. 
 Basic theory of the firm tells us that in the presence of fixed costs there is some minimum 
quantity below which it is unprofitable for any economic unit – be it a firm or a household – to 
supply to the market.  This implies that the true censoring point in the Tobit regression will not 
be zero but, rather, some unknown, positive quantity, θ > 0.  This quantity is important in the 
context of household’s decisions to enter the market because it circumscribes a minimum-
efficient scale of operations measured in terms of a sales quantity.  This quantity can be 
conceptualized in the context of the decision-making model (equations (1)-(5)), the statistical 
description of the hurdle model (equations (6)-(8)) and the estimation equations ((9)-(13)), as 
follows. 
 The presence of fixed costs, may or may not influence the participation decision but, we 
conjecture, they are likely to influence the quantity decision.  This is perhaps most apparent in 
the observation that at household level, trade is commonly discontinuous in time, with individual 
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households selling some periods and not selling in others.  Plainly, such a household is a market 
participant, although it opts for zero sales volume in some periods.  Put differently, the good it 
sells is tradable from its perspective even if it is not always traded.   This is conceptually akin to 
households adopting a new technology, then discontinuing its use at some future date(s) when it 
proves unprofitable (Cameron, 1999). 
 Hence, in the sales optimization problem (equation (2)), the constraint ysi ≥ 0 is replaced by 
the condition ysi ≥ θ.  This modification leads, in turn, to the notion that the observed data on 
sales, ysi**, are actually the maximum of the latent sales quantity, ysi*, as specified in (8), and the 
unknown quantity θ > 0.  Consequently, θ is now the censoring point in the Tobit regression.  As 
such θ becomes an additional parameter in the model and must be estimated, along with the 
system parameters Σ and β, the latent zp and the latent components of zs.   
 Devising the fully conditional distribution for θ would appear to be a difficult task were it not 
for its development in an apparently unrelated work by Albert and Chib.  In that work the authors 
consider a problem that has an almost identical structure to the model in (9)-(13) and a little 
algebra (available upon request) indicates that the full conditional distribution for the unknown θ 
is uniform on the interval [max{zsi, i∈c}, min{zsi, i∉c}].  The bounds on the interval of this 
uniform distribution are quite intuitive.  The left bound is simply the greatest value of latent sales 
from the non-participating household and the right bound is the minimum quantity of sales 
observed by the participating households.  Intuitively, because all of the households are the same 
(except for their endowments of the market-precipitating covariates), the unknown censoring 
point (the minimum efficient scale of operations) should lie between these values.   
 The censoring value, θ, can be estimated with a few basic modifications to the algorithm in 
(13).  Essentially, three modifications are required.  The first modification is to select, in Step 1, 
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a starting value θ(s).  We select the minimum sales quantity observed, i.e., the upper boundary of 
the feasible range for θ.  Second, the draws in steps 2-4 are now conditional on the chosen value 
θ(s).  Third, below step 5, insert the additional step: Step 5a: Draw θ(s+1) from the uniform 
distribution with bounds [max{zsi(s+1), i∈c}, min{zsi, i∉c}], where max{zsi(s+1), i∈c} implies 
conditioning on the maximum component of zs(s+1) in step 5 and where min{zsi, i∉c} denotes the 
minimum sales quantity observed in the data. 
 
The Application  
We apply this method to data on milk marketing by Ethiopian dairy farmers in two sites close to 
the capital city, Addis Ababa. The sites were identified in 1997 as potentially useful for 
examining the impacts of transactions costs on participation in peri-urban milk marketing.   We 
focus attentions on a subset of the farmers that have crossbreed cattle and make fluid milk sales 
to two milk cooperatives.  There are two reasons.   
 First, private milk sales in Ethiopia are often impeded by high fixed transactions costs. 
Among the more prominent of these are costs associated with equipment for manufacturing 
easily transportable dairy products (butter, cheese and yogurt) from fluid milk; pecuniary 
transport costs, such as the purchase of a cart or a donkey for haulage (a fixed cost);  non-
pecuniary transport costs, such as the reallocation of household labor toward hand transportation 
of products (which has both fixed and variable interpretations); and the inevitable time and risks 
associated with searching, negotiating and enforcing a sale, irrespective of the volume transacted 
(again, with both fixed and variable components).4  In this context, cooperative sales 
organizations purchasing fluid milk and manufacturing derivative products (butter, cheese and 
yogurt) are thought to be important catalysts stimulating participation into markets currently 
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constrained by considerable thinness.  Hence, cooperative selling is thought to be a significant 
transactions cost reducing innovation.   
 The orientation towards crossbreed animals at the study sites is motivated by the fact that 
crossbreed animals generate potential production increases (over indigenous breeds) of one-
hundred percent (milk-fat per metabolic weight of animal) have been recorded in station trials 
and these results are replicated to various degrees in field situations (Kiwuwa et al.).  Production 
gains of this magnitude are an obvious stimulus to marketable surplus in the household and 
thereby to overcoming the fixed costs to market participation.  . 
 
The Data 
Early in the 1997 production year a sample of 68 households was selected based on their 
stratification of cross-bred cow ownership and their physical location relative to two milk 
cooperatives.  Three visits were made to each household during the year, and at each visit weekly 
sales of fluid milk to the milk cooperatives were obtained from co-op records.  Demographic, 
nutritional and socioeconomic characteristics of the households were recorded.   
 The analysis focuses on the determinants of weekly sales of fluid milk at each of the 3 
visits—a sample size of 204 observations. Preliminary analysis with the data suggests that seven 
covariates are particularly influential in explaining milk production and marketing from these 
households.  Hence, estimation is conducted on a parsimonious choice of these seven effects, 
namely, (1) numbers of indigenous milking cows, (2) numbers of crossbred milking cows, (3) 
minutes, return time, to transport bucketed fluid milk to the milk cooperative, (4) years of formal 
schooling by household members, (5) the number of total visits by an extension agent discussing 
production and marketing practices, (6) a site-specific dummy variable corresponding to the ‘Ilu-
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Kura’ sample site (about 60 mile south-west of Addis Ababa) and (7) and a site-specific dummy 
variable corresponding to the Mirti sample site about (about 140 miles north-east of the capital 
city).   
 
Results 
Results of the Gibbs-sampling, data-augmentation algorithm applied to these 204 observations 
are presented in table 1.  The first column presents definitions and the remaining columns present 
the posterior means of the parameters in the multivariate probit-Tobit systems under traditional 
and non-zero censoring, respectively.  Auxiliary statistics are reported in the lower portion of the 
table.  The mnemonics in the first column refer, respectively, to θ (‘Censor value’); minutes  
return time to transport bucketed-fluid milk to the milk cooperative (‘Distance’); years of formal 
schooling by the household head (‘Education’); the number of crossbreed cows being milked at 
the survey date (‘Crossbred’); the number of indigenous-breed cows milked at the survey date 
(‘Local’); the total number of visits in the twelve months prior to the survey date by an extension 
agent discussing production and marketing practices (‘Extension’); a binary variable 
corresponding to the Ilu-Kura survey site (equals 1 if respondent is from Ilu-Kura and equals 0 
otherwise); and a binary variable corresponding to the Mirti survey site (equals 1 if respondent is 
from the Mirti survey site and equals 0 otherwise).  Numbers in parentheses below the parameter 
estimates are lower and upper bounds for the 95% highest-posterior density regions.   
 Considering, first, the traditional formulation with zero censoring in the Tobit regression, 
each of the parameter estimates are significant at the 5% significance level.  (None of the 95% 
highest posterior density regions contains zero.)  The signs of the posterior means all have the 
expected impact.  Participation is promoted by education, cow ownership and the level of 
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extension services, but is mitigated by distance to market.  Sales are also increased by the 
intellectual capital stock (education and extension visitation) and the animal stock (local and 
crossbreed animals) but is reduced by distance to market.   
 An important result in the context of two-step decision-making is the possibility that errors 
are correlated.  Previous work (most notably, Key et al., 2000) assumes independence The 
estimated covariance parameters suggest strongly that the participation and the sales decisions 
are highly correlated.  Other features of the traditional model are the relatively large degree of 
variability in the sales equation error variance (posterior mean estimate of 1047.40 liters of milk 
per household per week); outstanding predictive performance among the non-participating 
‘households’ (179 of the 204 total observations); but less satisfactory fit in the participating 
sample (25 observations in total).  Because 85% of the sample observations are censored, the 
poor prediction in the participating sample is somewhat expected due to small sub-sample size.  
But the large error variance in the sales equation suggests that a number of other omitted factors 
may be responsible for weekly sales variability. 
 Before turning to examine differences between the first formulation and the formulation that 
does not restrict the censoring value to be zero, a word about the covariate ‘Distance’ seems in 
order.  Recall that the purpose of relaxing the zero-restriction on the censoring value is to attempt 
to capture the importance of fixed costs and their affect on the minimum efficient supply 
quantity.  But there may be grounds for suspecting double counting with reference to some of the 
covariates.  For example, it is certainly true that there is a fixed cost related to distance (e.g., the 
cost of transporting the individual, not the milk, to market).  In this case, it may be argued that 
the covariate ‘Distance’ is capturing both proportional and fixed transactions costs.  Put 
differently, θ understates the fixed cost of market participation because of the distance-related 
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fixed cost.  Identification of proportional costs and separating them out from their corresponding 
contributions to fixed costs is problematic.  This point is made by Key et al. (2000) who attempt 
to distinguish between the two components empirically.  Whether it is possible to perform a 
similar decomposition using the current estimation strategy remains an interesting issue for 
possible extensions of the current effort. 
 Turning to the second, non-zero censoring formulation, the most interesting comparisons are 
three.  First, the posterior mean estimate of the censor value suggests that the minimum efficient 
scale of operations for the household is a resource base consistent with delivery of 5.26 liters of 
milk per week for a household located at the market delivery point.  Note, also that this estimate 
is measured at a considerable degree of precision (with 95% highest-posterior-density bounds of 
3.75 and 5.97, respectively).  Hence, one important conclusion emerging from the exercise is that 
a significant bias could result from restricting the censor value to zero.  Evidence of this potential 
bias is encountered in comparisons of the covariate estimates between the two models, which is 
the second important feature of comparison.  In both the participation and supply equations, each 
of the continuous covariate (i.e., other than the site dummies) coefficient estimates has the same 
sign across the two models.  But the magnitudes of the means estimates in the two equations 
exhibit an interesting pattern.  In the participation equation each of the estimates in the random-
censor model is greater (in absolute value) than the corresponding estimate in the traditional 
model and in the supply equation each of the estimates is smaller (in absolute value) than the 
corresponding estimate in the traditional, zero censoring model.  Further, in both the 
participation and supply equations, the site-specific dummy coefficients are greater under 
random censoring than in the traditional formulation.  Hence, having concluded that the true 
point of censoring is not zero, these results suggest that ignoring the importance of potential 
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fixed costs in the supply decision has three impacts on the double-hurdle estimates.  First, it 
biases downwards both estimates of the impact of the covariates on participation and the impact 
of ‘other factors’ as depicted by the constant terms.  Second, it biases upwards estimates of the 
impacts of the covariates on supply but biases downwards estimates of the impacts of ‘other 
factors’ on supply as evidenced in reports of the coefficients of the site-specific dummies.  In 
short, the net impacts of ignoring fixed costs are a lower prediction about likelihood of 
participation and a higher prediction about supply potency.  Further evidence that the second 
formulation is a better description of the data is evidenced by the reports of dramatically lower 
error variances and the improved predictive statistics in the lower part of the table.  This is not 
just an idle methodological point.  The practical implication is that increasing market 
participation is central to expanded aggregate supply, so traditional price policy prescriptions 
that rest upon the assumption of ubiquitous market participation may not be the most effective 
means of increasing market supply. 
 
Conclusions 
Collectively, these results demonstrate the importance of allowing for non-negligible fixed costs 
in market participation (adoption) studies.  When these costs are ignored but are non-negligible, 
a significant bias in participation and supply estimation appears to exist.  In the context of 
examining this issue, we have presented a Bayesian approach to estimation of the double-hurdle 
model, which is popular because it allows for a potentially diverse set of factors to influence 
participation and supply decisions.  Our analysis, however, suggests that in these data on 
highland Ethiopian milk producers, the same factors influence both participation and supply and 
that the intellectual capital stock (education and extension visitation) is a vital complement to the 
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physical capital stock (both local and crossbred animals) in effecting market entry among 
formerly subsistence households. With the intent of expanding the density of milk-market 
participation in peri-urban settings, extension agents and policy makers should target these inputs 
with a view to expanding household capacities above a minimum of  5.26 liters of milk per 
household per week. 
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Footnotes 
1 The entire procedure took approximately ten minutes of real time on a DELL™ Optiplex G1 
machine running a Pentium™ II processor at 330 megahertz with commands executed in 
MATLAB™ version 5.1.0.421.  All computer code is available upon request. 
2 See Albert and Chib, equation (18), for a similar development in the context of the ordered 
probit specification. 
3 Experiments with the non-zero censoring algorithm suggest that these additional steps 
consumed negligible additional time. 
4 Proportional, variable costs plainly matter as well, but these have no effect on the censoring 
point, they merely adjust the net price received per unit sold, like an ad valorem tax.  Fixed costs, 
by contrast, create the non-zero censoring point of interest here.   
5 These are the Bayesian equivalents to the traditional confidence intervals encountered in 
sampling theory. 
6 Key et al. (2000) make similar observations in their work on Mexican maize markets.  They 
find, for example, that 60 percent of the increase in marketed maize supply in response to maize 
price increases is due to increased market participation, only 40 percent due to expanded sales by 
existing market participants. 
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 Table 1.  Double-Hurdle Equation Estimates. 
 Model 
 Zero Censoring Non-Zero Censoring 
 Participation Sales Participation Sales 
Censor Value    5.26 
    (3.75, 5.97) 
Distance -0.02 -0.46 -0.02 -0.31 
 (-0.03, -0.01) (-0.76, -0.17) (-0.05, -0.01) (-0.51, -0.12) 
Education 0.17 4.21 0.22 2.59 
 (0.08, 0.26) (1.60, 7.35) (0.08, 0.40) (0.94, 4.53) 
Crossbred 0.80 28.61 1.02 21.68 
 (0.48, 1.20) (20.45, 39.00) (0.58, 1.64) (16.18, 29.00) 
Local 0.29 12.75 0.40 10.00 
 (0.04, 0.55) (5.59, 19.77) (0.07, 0.80) (5.64, 14.81) 
Extension 0.16 4.39 0.20 2.87 
 (0.06, 0.27) (1.58, 7.37) (0.09, 0.35) (1.24, 4.49) 
Ilu-Kura -1.68 -64.82 3.12 -38.12 
 (-2.53, -0.87) (-98.00, -38.51) (1.65, 4.31) (-58.71,-22.51) 
Mirti -3.08 -102.57 1.33 -61.95 
 (-3.97, -2.18) (-150.09,-67.92) (-0.98, 2.70) (-91.09, -41.36) 
 Covariance 
Participation 1.00 9.42 1.00 6.29 
  (4.60, 14.99)  (3.46, 9.64) 
Sales (symmetric) 1047.40 (symmetric) 345.08 
  (475.38,2045.15)  (154.72, 686.32) 
 Auxiliary Statistics 
 Non-Participants 
R2 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.87 
Pos. pred. 3.00 4.00 2.00 8.00 
Neg. pred. 176.00 175.00 177.00 171.00 
 Participants 
R2 0.92 0.33 0.84 0.39 
Pos. pred. 11.00 11.00 25.00 13.00 
Neg. pred. 14.00 14.00 0 12.00 
Note: 95% highest posterior density values are reported in parentheses. 
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